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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20170977-CA
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
ROBERT BRIAN WALTON,
Defendant/Appellant.
Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Section 78A-4-103(2)(e).
INTRODUCTION
In 2014, Robert Brian Walton pleaded guilty to one count of retaliation
against a witness, and in doing so agreed to the entry of a permanent criminal
stalking injunction as part of his sentence. In 2017, Mr. Walton asked the trial
court to vacate the stalking injunction as an illegal sentence because he was not
convicted of stalking. The trial court denied his motion.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err in rejecting Mr. Walton’s argument that the
issuance of a permanent criminal stalking injunction is an illegal sentence in
violation of rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, where Mr. Walton was
not convicted of stalking?

Standard of Review. A district court’s Rule 22(e) decision is a legal
question reviewed for correctness. See State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 384-85
(Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Preservation. Rule 22(e) challenges are not subject to the preservation
rule because “‘because an illegal sentence is void and, like issues of jurisdiction
[may be raised] at any time.’” State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 20, 353 P.3d 55
(quoting State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ¶ 9, 232 P.3d 1008) (alteration in
original). In any event, this issue was preserved at 1R1002-1007; 1R1078-86;
1R2434-2463.
2.

If the stalking injunction is an illegal sentence, should Mr. Walton’s

conviction for violating it be vacated along with the injunction?
Standard of Review. Although a guilty plea generally precludes direct
appellate review, if there was no stalking injunction, his conviction for violating it
would be void. See State v. Lee Lim, 7 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1932) (“A judgment
which is void … is a mere nullity.”).
Preservation. The preservation rule does not apply, however, Mr. Walton
raised this issue at sentencing. 2R834.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are reproduced
in Addendum A:
U.S. Const. amend. V;
U.S. Const. amend. VI;
Utah Const. art. I, § 12;
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Utah Code Section 76-5-106.5 (2011);
Utah Code Section 76-5-106.5 (2018);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508.3;
Utah R. Crim. P. 22.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal involves two related district court cases, which were
consolidated for appeal. For the Court’s convenience, record citations to Case
No. 121903179 will be referred to as 1R, and citations to Case No. 161907013 will
be referred to as 2R. Although he had some representation in the trial court, Mr.
Walton largely represented himself. He requested, but was denied, courtappointed counsel to argue the rule 22(e) motion. 1R2425-2426. Mr. Walton was
later found to be indigent and counsel was appointed for his appeal. R1191-1192.
1. Procedural and Factual Background
Case No. 121903179. On April 3, 2012, Mr. Walton was charged with
retaliation against witness, a third degree felony, stalking, a class A
misdemeanor, assault, a class B misdemeanor, wrongful detention, a class B
misdemeanor, and threat of violence, a class B misdemeanor. 1R1-4. The
information alleged that Mr. Walton used force and threats to get [K.B] to sign a
motion to dismiss a civil stalking injunction. 1R2-4. Mr. Walton denied all the
allegations against him, but on December 8, 2014, entered an Alford plea to the
retaliation against witness charge.1 1R984-85, 1R994-95. The factual basis for

Mr. Walton represented himself at the change of plea hearing but had standby
counsel. 1R987-88.
1
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the plea was: “On or about 3/1/2012 [K.B.] would testify that I made a threat of
harm against [K.B.] believing an investigation was about to begin.” 1R987. As
part of the plea agreement, the State dismissed the other charges and “anything
prior to Dec. 8, 2014” with prejudice. 1R986-992, 1R1000-1001, 1R2406-2407.
The State also agreed to recommend a 330-day sentence with credit for time
served, after which the case would be closed.2 1R989. Also as part of the
agreement, Mr. Walton agreed to the entry of a permanent criminal stalking
injunction. Id. . At sentencing, Mr. Walton made clear that “there has been no
stalking,” but was agreeing to the injunction “as required by the agreement.”
1R2407-08. The trial court accepted the Alford plea and sentenced Mr. Walton
according to the terms of the plea. 1R995.
Case No. 161907013. On July 7, 2016, Mr. Walton was charged with
three counts of stalking, all third degree felonies. 2R1-4. The information alleged
that on July 2 and 3, 2017, Mr. Walton approached K.B. and attempted to talk to
her in violation of the permanent civil stalking injunction issued in Case No.
121903179. On October 16, 2017, Mr. Walton entered an Alford plea to one count
of stalking, and the State dismissed the other two charges. 2R542-544. The
factual basis for the plea was that the State had evidence that “On July 2, 2016

At the time of his plea, Mr. Walton had been incarcerated for over 24 months on
a $150,000.00 bond, see, e.g. 1R1447; 1R244, and he was informed by standby
counsel that the plea was his only way to be immediately released. 1R2401,
1R2410-11.
2
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Robert Walton went to [K.B.’s] residence.”3 2R549. Mr. Walton was ordered to
serve 36 months of probation with credit for time served, and another permanent
criminal stalking injunction was entered. 2R543, 2R841. Standby counsel
alerted the trial court to the potential for a collateral attack on the conviction
because if the conviction in Case No. 121903179 “was removed, then this case
might be, too.” 2R834. When the court inquired into the State’s position on the
matter, the prosecutor stated, “that’s fine.” Id.
The Rule 22(e) Motion. On October 5, 2017, Mr. Walton filed a pro se
motion to set aside the criminal stalking injunction issued in case No. 121903179
on the basis that it was an illegal sentence under rule 22(e). 1R1002. Mr. Walton
argued that he was entitled to be resentenced because under Utah law, a criminal
stalking injunction could only be entered as part of a sentence on a conviction of
stalking, a crime for which he had not been convicted. 1R1002-1007; 1R1078-86.
The State argued that there was no statutory bar to the parties’ agreement to the
entry of a criminal stalking injunction, that the motion appeared to be a collateral
attack on the charges in Case No. 161907013, that Mr. Walton could not
unilaterally alter the terms of the plea deal, and that he invited any error. 1R11011119. The trial court agreed with the State, ruling that the permanent criminal

Mr. Walton had previously moved to dismiss the charges on the basis that the
injunction was not actually entered by the trial court until after the alleged
conduct, and Mr. Walton reasonably believed it had been dismissed. 2R44-47,
2R757, 2R826. At the time of his plea, Mr. Walton had been incarcerated for
approximately five months and was informed that he would not be granted
pretrial release. 2R832.
3
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stalking injunction was not expressly barred, and that Mr. Walton had agreed to
the injunction “in the context of the settlement.” 1R1187, 1R2462-2463.
2. Disposition.
The trial court denied the rule 22(e) motion in Case No. 121903179. 1R10991100. Mr. Walton timely appealed from that denial. 1R1107. He also timely
appealed from his sentence in Case No. 161907013. 2R596.4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Case No. 121903179. The trial court erred in denying Mr. Walton’s Rule
22(e) motion because a permanent civil stalking injunction is not an authorized
sentencing enhancement for a conviction of retaliation against a witness, and
because the factual basis for the plea does not support the imposition of such a
penalty. Because the agreement to the imposition of a permanent criminal
stalking injunction appears to be the result of a mistake of law, the burden of risk
lies with the State. As a result, Mr. Walton asks that the Court strike the
injunction from the plea agreement, hold that the stalking injunction is void ab
initio, and remand for resentencing to time served.
Case No. 161907013. If the Court rules that that the stalking injunction
is an illegal sentence, Mr. Walton respectfully asks that the Court vacate his

The minute entry and Court order denying the Rule 22(e) Motion, and the
sentencing minutes from both cases are attached in Addendum B.
4
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conviction and sentence in Case No. 161907013 as void ab initio because the
conduct alleged would not be criminal absent the injunction.
ARGUMENT
I.

The permanent criminal stalking injunction is an illegal
sentence.
The trial court erred in its conclusion that the criminal stalking injunction

was not an illegal sentence because Mr. Walton agreed to it and there was no
express statutory bar against its imposition. As will be shown, such an injunction
is a sentencing enhancement that is only provided for under the criminal stalking
statute, and requires a finding of the elements of criminal stalking to be imposed.
It therefore is beyond the statutory range, is not supported by the factual basis for
the plea, and should be vacated, even if Mr. Walton agreed to it.
A. A permanent criminal stalking injunction is not within the
statutory guidelines for a retaliation against a witness
conviction.
A court may at any time correct a sentence that “exceeds the statutorily
authorized maximums” or “includes a condition prohibited by statute.”5 Utah R.
Crim. P. 22(e). “Because an illegal sentence is void, the court does not lose
jurisdiction over the sentence until that sentence has been corrected.” State v.
Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Rule 22(e) allows a court to
retain jurisdiction over sentences that are patently illegal or manifestly illegal, i.e.

Prior to May 1, 2017, Rule 22(e) provided, “The court may correct an illegal
sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time.”
5
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(1) where the sentencing court has no jurisdiction, or (2) where the sentence is
beyond the authorized statutory range.” State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ¶
15, 84 P.3d 854 (citation omitted). The rule also applies if the sentence itself is
unconstitutional. State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ¶ 13, 232 P.3d 1008.
“It is axiomatic that a sentence is illegal if it exceeds the statutory
guidelines.” State v. Styer, 2008 UT App 176. “‘[U]nder the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum
penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476
(2000) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)). “The
Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in this case involving a state
statute.” Id. Thus, “[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected
in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296, 303 (2004). “When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict
alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law makes
essential to the punishment,’ and the judge exceeds his proper authority.” Id. at
304 (quoting 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure § 87, at 55 (2d ed. 1872)). See, e.g.,
State v. Ahmed, 924 P.2d 679, 685 (Mont. 1996) (striking parole condition
requiring deportation as illegal because district court lacked jurisdiction to order
deportation without due process).
-8-

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution also requires that a jury find
all elements of a crime, including conduct that amounts to a sentencing
enhancement, beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ¶ 16, 980
P.2d 191 (gang enhancement is separate offense, and trial court could not
supplement the “plea by making the factual finding that the elements of the gang
enhancement were established”).
In the context of a guilty plea, the statutory maximum sentence allowed is
determined by the facts admitted by the defendant in pleading guilty or found by
the jury at trial. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304 (“The judge in this case could not
have imposed the exceptional 90-month sentence solely on the basis of the facts
admitted in the guilty plea.”); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002)
(quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483) (“exceeding the maximum he would receive
if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone”); State v.
Gibson, 2017 UT App 142, ¶ 19, 405 P.3d 716 (Court ordered restitution not
justified where defendant “did not admit responsibility for [the victim’s] losses,
and the State has not met its burden to show that Gibson was the but-for cause of
them”); State v. Samul, 2015 UT App 23, ¶ 18, 343 P.3d 719 (citing Utah Code
Ann. § 76-4-102(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014)) (“Because the original sentence [of
three years to life for attempted aggravated kidnapping] exceeded the statutorily
authorized sentence for the crime, ... there is no dispute that the original sentence
was illegal.”). “If an offense for which a defendant is convicted differs from an
offense that is the subject of a plea, that plea may not, as a matter of law, form the
-9-

basis for the imposition of an enhanced sentence.” State v. Helmick, 2000 UT
70, ¶ 16, 9 P.3d 164.
Similarly, a sentence that is not authorized by statute violates Rule 11,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 551
(Utah 1996) (a determinate 2-year sentencing enhancement was illegal where the
statute authorized only an indeterminate term of up to five years); State v.
Daughton, 2013 UT App 170, ¶ 21, 308 P.3d 537 (Sentence was illegal where the
penalty imposed was authorized by statute in effect at sentencing but was not
authorized by statute in effect at time of charged conduct). And, conditions of
probation and parole that are not authorized by statute have also been found
illegal, even where not expressly barred. See State v. Arviso, 1999 UT App 381, ¶
7, 993 P.2d 894 (agreed-to suspension of prison sentence “on condition [he] not
return to the United States” was illegal sentence because it exceeded trial court’s
authority). Conditions of probation and parole that were not authorized by
statute have also been found to be illegal sentences in other jurisdictions, even
where not expressly barred. See, e.g., State v. Schad, 206 P. 3d 22, 35 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2009) (citing cases and holding that requiring posting signs as condition of
probation is not expressly or implicitly authorized by statute); State v.
Muhammad, 43 P.3d 318 (Mont. 2002) (holding probation condition of
banishment to be unauthorized by statute).
Here, the trial court erred in denying Mr. Walton’s Rule 22(e) motion
because a permanent civil stalking injunction is an enhancement that is not
-10-

supported by the factual basis for Mr. Walton’s Alford plea. See Utah R. Crim. P.
22(e); Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ¶ 16, 980 P.2d 191. Rather, a permanent criminal
stalking injunction is a life-long restriction that extended Mr. Walton’s sentence
well beyond the five-year maximum sentence for the retaliation against a witness
conviction.
Utah Code Section 76-5-106.5 defines criminal stalking and governs the
entry of permanent criminal stalking injunctions. The stalking statute at the time
of the alleged conduct stated, “A conviction for stalking … serves as an application
for a permanent criminal stalking injunction limiting the contact between the
defendant and the victim.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (2011). In other words,
proof of all the elements of stalking is the trigger for the sentencing enhancement
of a criminal stalking injunction. It is those elements that must be found by the
fact finder or admitted to by the defendant before such an injunction can be
entered. See State v. Kropf, 2015 UT App 223, ¶ 23, 360 P.3d 1 (quoting State v.
Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, ¶ 13, 203 P.3d 984) (Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, appropriately invoked to correct the sentence for a stalking conviction
by imposing an injunction); cf. Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 08, ¶ 22, 322 P.3d 728
(for civil stalking injunction, “the essential statutory element is proof of
‘stalking.’”).
The Utah code did not at the time of the alleged conduct, and does not
now, appear to provide any way short of proof of stalking to apply for a
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permanent criminal stalking injunction. Indeed, Mr. Walton could not find a case
in which such an injunction was properly imposed absent a stalking conviction.
Retaliation against a witness is a third degree felony statute which includes
no enhancements, let alone a provision allowing for a permanent criminal
stalking injunction. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508.3. The maximum
sentence for a third degree felony is, “unless the statute provides otherwise, for a
term not to exceed five years.” Id. § 76-3-203(3) (2018). In addition, Utah Code
Section 76-3-201, which defines the court’s general sentencing authority to
include discretion in areas such as probation includes no general authority to
impose a permanent criminal stalking injunction.
The factual basis for Mr. Walton’s plea—that there was evidence he “made
a threat of harm against [K.B.] believing an investigation was about to begin,”
1R987—supports his conviction for one count of retaliation against a witness. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508.3 (“if, believing that an official proceeding or
investigation … is about to be instituted… he: (a) (i) makes a threat of harm …
against a witness or an informant regarding any official proceeding … and (ii) as
retaliation or retribution against the witness, victim, or informant”).
It does not support a conviction of stalking. “A person is guilty of stalking
who intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a
specific person and knows or should know that the course of conduct would cause
a reasonable person:
(a) to fear for the person’s own safety or the safety of a third person; or
-12-

(b) to suffer other emotional distress.” Id. (emphasis added).
Importantly, the factual basis for Mr. Walton’s plea does not support a
course of conduct directed at any person. 1R987. His admission that there was
evidence he made “a threat of harm against [K.B.]” relates to just one singular
event, not an entire course of conduct as required to prove stalking. 1R987. At
the change of plea hearing, Mr. Walton specifically denied stalking. 1R2407 (“I
would like to remind that there has been no stalking and there is no stalking
conviction in this case.”), and it was clarified at the hearing that the permanent
criminal stalking injunction would be entered even though there had been no
stalking conviction. 1R2406.
The absence of any factual basis that could support the entry of a
permanent criminal stalking injunction rendered Mr. Walton’s sentence illegal.
Such an injunction imposes a permanent bar against contact with the victim, and
against entering the victim’s residence, property, school, or place of employment.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403.1(2)(10). It may only be dismissed by application of
the victim. See id. § 76-5-403.1(11). Because of the significant life-time restraint
inflicted by such an injunction, it is a sentencing enhancement under the
meaning of Apprendi, and therefore cannot be ordered absent a factual finding of
stalking. There is simply no basis for such an injunction to be imposed where
Mr. Walton’s conviction was one count of retaliation against a witness, and the
factual basis for his plea includes no “course of conduct” that could support a
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stalking conviction. The permanent criminal stalking injunction is therefore an
illegal sentence.
B.
The remedy for the illegal sentence is to remand to vacate
the permanent criminal stalking injunction.
The agreement to the entry of a permanent criminal stalking injunction
was a mistake of law which entitles Mr. Walton to enforcement of the plea
agreement and resentencing to time served. See State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381,
387 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). “[A]lthough courts recognize that ‘principles of
contract law provide a useful analytic framework’ in cases involving plea
agreements, they also recognize that there are limits to the contract analogy, and
that contract principles ‘cannot be blindly incorporated into the criminal law in
the area of plea bargaining.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353,
358 (5th Cir. 1980)).
“Under contract law, a party may not rescind an agreement based on
mutual mistake where that party bears the risk of mistake.” Id. at 387-88. In
plea agreements, the State bears “the risk of the mistake as to the law in effect at
the time the parties entered into the plea agreement.” Id. at 388. This is because
The State is generally in the better position to know the correct law,
given that the State has control over the charges in the information
and final say over whether to accept a defendant's plea, and the State
must be deemed to know the law it is enforcing. Indeed, it is the
State's law, duly enacted by its legislative branch, that is in issue. The
State must be charged with knowledge of its own legislative
enactments and, in that sense, cannot be said to have been mistaken
about the governing statute in effect when it agreed to the plea
arrangement.

-14-

Id.; accord State v. Johnson, 2012 UT 68, ¶ 18 n.7, 290 P.3d 21 (quoting United
States v. Burke, 633 F.3d 984, 994 (10th Cir. 2011)) (general “‘principles of
contract law define the government’s obligations under the agreement, looking to
the express language and construing any ambiguities against the government as
the drafter of the agreement’”). Thus, in Patience, the defendant was entitled to
resentencing for a class A misdemeanor, the actual statutory sentence, where the
plea agreement incorrectly assumed that forgery was a third degree felony. See
Patience, 944 P.2d at 388. Likewise, a defendant was entitled to be sentenced for
a third degree felony rather than a second degree felony where the factual basis
for his plea did not support a drug free zone enhancement from a third degree to
a second degree felony. See State v. Sinju, 1999 UT App 150U, ¶ 6.
Similarly here, where there is no statutory basis for the imposition of a
permanent criminal stalking injunction, Mr. Walton should be entitled to
enforcement of a plea agreement.
Mr. Walton served more than 24 months in jail before entering the Alford
plea, and he relied to his detriment on the deal by accepting a conviction for the
greater felony offense in exchange for the dismissal of the misdemeanor charges.
This is therefore not a case where the appropriate remedy should be vacating the
plea in its entirety. See State v. Arviso, 1999 UT App 381, ¶ 9, 993 P.2d 894
(“Where the defendant has entered a guilty plea pursuant to a plea bargain
contemplating a particular sentence, the general rule is that the defendant is
entitled to withdraw the plea if it is subsequently determined that the sentence is
-15-

illegal or unauthorized. The withdrawal of a guilty plea returns the parties to their
initial positions, and the original charges under the indictment or information
may be reinstated.”); State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ¶ 15, 60 P.3d 582
(vacating plea agreement where there was “no meeting of the minds
as to the meaning of ‘total victim restitution.’”). Rather, this is a case such as
Patience where the State should bear the risk of the mistake in law that led to the
imposition of the illegal sentence, and the case should be remanded for
resentencing to time served. See Patience, 944 P.2d at 388; accord Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-405 (“Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct
review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the
same offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more
severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously
satisfied.”); State v. Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶ 65, 274 P.3d 919 (resentencing violated
double jeopardy protections where defendant was “resentenced months after his
initial sentence” and was “nearly doubled in a sui generis proceeding based on
new evidence gathered during the course of his confinement”); State v. Samora,
2004 UT 79, ¶ 25, 99 P.3d 858 (“[T]here are instances where an ‘illegal sentence’
or a ‘sentence imposed in an illegal manner’ may present the same chilling effect
on a defendant's basic right to appeal and the potential for vindictiveness at
resentencing.”); Sinju, 1999 UT App 150U, ¶ 6 (where record included no facts to
support the drug free zone enhancement, the defendant was entitled to
resentencing but not to withdrawal of his plea). As a result, the proper remedy is
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not withdrawal of the guilty plea, but a remand for purposes of vacating the
stalking injunction and resentencing Mr. Walton to time served.
II.

The conviction and sentence in Case No. 161907013 are
void.
Mr. Walton acknowledges the general rule that direct appellate review “‘is

barred when the “conviction” being challenged is in the form of a guilty plea and
the defendant attempts to withdraw that plea using a rule 22(e) challenge.’” State
v. Kragh, 2011 UT App 108, ¶ 10, 255 P.3d 685 (quoting State v. Nicholls, 2006
UT 76, ¶ 5, 148 P.3d 990). However, in this case, if the Court agrees with Mr.
Walton that the permanent criminal stalking injunction was an illegal sentence,
which should be vacated, it would serve the interests of judicial economy to
vacate the conviction Case No. 161907013 in this proceeding. If the stalking
injunction were an illegal sentence, Mr. Walton’s conviction for violating it and
the resulting sentence, including the new criminal stalking injunction, would be
void ab initio. See State v. Lee Lim, 7 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1932) (“A judgment
which is void … is a mere nullity.”). This is because the factual basis for the plea
was merely that there was evidence that “on July 2, 2016 Robert Walton went to
[K.B.’s] residence.” R549. Such conduct would not have been criminal had the
permanent criminal stalking injunction not been in place. And, as a result, the
sentence of probation and a second permanent criminal stalking injunction
would also be an illegal sentence. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (1)(A), (e)(1)(F). If
there were no permanent criminal stalking injunction in place, simply going to a
person’s home would not amount to the crime of violating a stalking injunction.
-17-

As a result, Mr. Walton respectfully requests that if the Court decides the
permanent criminal stalking injunction was an illegal sentence, that it also vacate
his subsequent conviction and sentence for violating it. State v. Parker, 872 P.2d
1041, 1048 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (“The fact is that his conviction has been
vacated. Accordingly, defendant is now entitled to a return of those fees he was
required to pay because his conviction has been vacated.”); Utah R. Crim. P. 28
(“If no further trial or proceeding is to be had a defendant in custody shall be
discharged.”).
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, in Case No. 121903179, Mr. Walton asks
this Court to vacate the permanent criminal stalking injunction as an illegal
sentence, and to remand for resentencing to time served. In Case No. 161907013,
Mr. Walton respectfully requests that his conviction and sentence be vacated as
void ab initio.
Respectfully submitted on November 23, 2018.

/s/ Deborah L. Bulkeley
Counsel for Appellant
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